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Congressional Authority Over the Federal Courts
Summary
This report examines Congress' legislative authority with respect to the Judicial
Branch. While Congress has broad power to regulate the structure, administration and
jurisdiction of the courts, its powers are limited by precepts of due process, equal
protection and separation of powers. Usually congressional oversight of the judicial
branch is noncontroversial, but when Congress proposes to use its oversight and
regulatory powers in a manner designed to affect the outcome of pending or
previously decided cases, constitutional issues can be raised. In recent years,
Congress has considered using or has exercised its authority in an effort to affect the
results in cases concerning a number of issues, including abortion, gay marriage,
freedom of religion, “right to die” and prisoners’ rights. 
This report addresses the constitutional foundation of the federal courts, and the
explicit and general authorities of Congress to regulate the courts. It then addresses
Congress’ ability to limit the jurisdiction of the courts over particular issues,
sometimes referred to as “court-stripping.” The report then analyzes Congress’
authority to regulate the availability of certain judicial processes and remedies for
litigants. Congressional power to legislate regarding specific judicial decisions is also
discussed.
Recent laws which are relevant to this discussion include the Prison Litigation
Reform Act Legislation and a law “For the relief of the parents of Theresa Marie
Schiavo.” Various proposals were also passed by the House, but not the Senate, in
the 108th Congress.  For instance, starting in July 2003, an amendment was passed
by the House to limit the use of funds to enforce a federal court decision regarding
the Pledge of Allegiance. Then, in July 2004, the House passed H.R. 3313, the
Marriage Protection Act, which would have limited Federal court jurisdiction over
questions regarding the Defense of Marriage Act.  Finally, in September 2004, the
House passed H.R. 2028, the Pledge Protection Act, which was intended to limit the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear cases regarding the Pledge of Allegiance.
Much of the material in the section on congressional power over court
jurisdiction is also included in CRS Report RL32171, Limiting Court Jurisdiction
Over Federal Constitutional Issues: 'Court-Stripping,' by Kenneth R. Thomas.
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1 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
Congressional Authority Over the Federal
Courts
This report examines Congress' legislative  authority with respect to the Judicial
Branch. While Congress has broad power to regulate the structure, administration and
jurisdiction of the courts, its powers are limited by precepts of due process, equal
protection and separation of powers. Usually congressional regulation of the judicial
branch is noncontroversial, but when Congress proposes to use its powers in a
manner designed to affect the outcome of pending or previously decided cases,
constitutional issues can be raised. For instance, Congress has in recent years
considered using or has exercised its authority in an attempt to affect the results in
cases concerning a number of issues, including abortion, gay marriage, freedom of
religion, “right to die” and prisoners’ rights.
This report addresses the constitutional foundation of the federal courts, and the
explicit and general authorities of Congress to regulate the courts. It then addresses
Congress’ ability to limit the jurisdiction of the courts over particular constitutional
issues, sometime referred to as “court-stripping.” The report then analyzes Congress’
authority to limit the availability of certain judicial processes and remedies for
constitutional litigants. Congressional power to legislate regarding specific judicial
decisions is also discussed. Much of the material in the section on congressional
power over court jurisdiction is also included in CRS Report RL32171, Limiting
Court Jurisdiction Over Federal Constitutional Issues: 'Court-Stripping,' Kenneth
R. Thomas.
I.  Congressional Powers Under the Constitution
A. Over the Federal Courts
 If one reads the first three Articles of the Constitution carefully, a striking
observation immediately emerges. Article I (the legislative branch) is quite detailed
and specific with respect to the authority of and limits on Congress, especially when
compared with Article II (the executive branch) and Article III (the judicial branch).
One reason for this detail is that Article I deals not only with the nature of the
legislature but also with the overall powers of the Federal Government. But this
contrast also makes it clear that Congress possesses the authority to fill out the
powers conferred on the Executive and Judiciary. This is revealed in several specific
provisions but most notably in the final provision of the Article, the “necessary and
proper clause.”1  That clause not only empowers Congress to enact all “necessary and
proper” laws in order to execute the powers conferred on Congress, but also allows
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2 The latter part of this quoted language dovetails with clause 9 of § 8 of Article I, under
which Congress is authorized “[t]o constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.”
3 Although the position of Chief Justice is not specifically mandated, it is referenced in
Article I, § 3, Cl. 6, in connection with the procedure for the Senate impeachment trial of
a President:
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for
that Purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the
United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: and no Person shall be
convicted without Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present.
4 By the Judiciary Act of 1789, it was established that the Court was to be composed of the
Chief Justice and five Associate Justices. The number of Justices was gradually increased
to ten, until in 1869 the number was fixed at nine, where it has remained to this day.
5 Thus, following Lincoln’s assassination and acrimonious dispute between President
Andrew Johnson and the Reconstruction Congress, the legislators took a number of steps
to ensure that Johnson would have no appointments to the Court by providing that the
number of Justices would be reduced from ten to seven as vacancies occurred. A more far-
reaching, though ultimately unsuccessful, effort occurred as a result of the Supreme Court’s
decisions blocking several initiatives of the New Deal. In February 1937, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt proposed, in part, that Congress authorize the appointment of an additional
Justice for each of the incumbent Justices older than 70 who did not retire within six months
of his 70th birthday.  This would have given the President four appointees and an opportunity
for reversal of some of the decisions to which he objected.  Although the President was
coming off his overwhelming 1936 re-election, Congress could not be prevailed on to give
him this victory.
6 Thus, the traditional “first Monday in October” is solely a statutory creation. 
7 In 1801, after the Jeffersonians took control of the Presidency and of Congress, the
Judiciary Act of 1801, enacted by the Federalists after the 1800 elections to maintain control
(continued...)
Congress to make laws to execute “all other powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States or in any department or officer thereof.”
The Constitution contains few requirements regarding the structure of the
federal courts. Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution provides that 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.2 The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.
Although Article III provides for a Supreme Court headed by the Chief Justice
of the United States,3 nothing else about its structure and its operation is specified,
so the size and composition of the Court is left to Congress.4 The lack of a
constitutionally prescribed number has provided opportunities to manipulate, or to
attempt to manipulate, the Court.5 As Congress also determines the time and place
of the Supreme Court’s meeting,6 it has also used this power to influence the make-
up of the judiciary. 7
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of the courts by creating additional judgeships and circuit courts (as well as abolishing
circuit riding by the Justices), was repealed.  No provision was made for the displaced
judges, despite the “good behavior” tenure guarantee.  Fearful that the repeal, at least in part,
would be challenged before a Court composed of Federalist appointees, Congress, in the
same law, changed the dates of the Terms of the Court so that the Justices did not convene
for fourteen months. Ultimately, the constitutionality of the 1801 repeal was not litigated,
but the Court in the aftermath did render one of its most seminal cases, in Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cr. (5 U.S.) 137 (1803)(chastising the Jeffersonians, but holding invalid a
section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which Chief Justice Marshall construed as illegally
vesting original jurisdiction in the Court). See also Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cr. (5 U.S.) 299
(1803)(sustaining circuit riding by Justices and scarcely noticing the question of the repeal
of the 1801 Act).
8 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-131, 132.
9 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 43 (District of Columbia Circuit, First Circuit through Eleventh Circuit,
Federal Circuit). 
10 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 151 (U.S. bankruptcy courts); 251 (U.S. Court of International
Trade).
11 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 41 (U.S. courts of appeals); 
12 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 48 (U.S. courts of appeals); 81-131 (U.S. district courts).
13 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1 (U.S. Supreme Court justices); 44 (circuit judges for U.S. courts
of appeals for the eleven circuits); 133 (U.S. district court judges).
14 Art. I, § 9, cl. 7, U.S. Constitution, states: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account
of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.”
15 See, e.g., H.R. 3349 (108th Congress), to authorize salary adjustments for justices and
judges.  For further discussion of the current provisions of law governing judicial pay and
some historical context on the subject, see CRS Report RS20278, “Judicial Salary-Setting
Policy,” Sharon S. Gressle.
16 28 U.S.C. § 601-613.
17 28 U.S.C. § 332.
18 28 U.S.C. § 333.
19 28 U.S.C. § 331.
Utilizing its power to establish inferior courts, Congress has created the United
States district courts,8 the courts of appeals for the thirteen circuits,9 and other federal
courts,10 identified their location,11 the places in which they sit,12 and the number of
justices or judges for each court.13 Congress, has also addressed a range of aspects of
the administration of the courts.  For example, Congress, through its exercise of
Spending Clause power,14 provides funding for the operation of the courts, including
judicial salaries,15 subject to the limitation on diminution of compensation of judges
during their terms of office.  The Administrative Office of the United States Courts
is established by statute,16 as are the judicial councils of the circuits,17 the judicial
conferences of the circuits,18 and the Judicial Conference of the United States.19
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20 Under current law, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2075 and 2077 set forth statutory authority for
promulgation of rules of procedure and practice. Under 26 U.S.C. § 7453, the Tax Court has
authority to prescribe rules to govern procedure and practice before it. The United States
Supreme Court, the United States Claims Court, and the United States Court of International
Trade have each promulgated rules to govern procedure and process in the cases before
them. U.S. district courts and U.S. courts of appeals have also promulgated local rules under
Section 2071 authority. 
21 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, § 17(b), 1 Stat. 73, 83.
22 Five days later, the First Congress directed that, in actions at law, procedures in federal
court should parallel in each state the rules then used or allowed by the supreme court of that
state.  Act of Sept. 29, 1789, c. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93.  In 1792, Congress confirmed by statute
that procedures for actions at law in federal courts were to be in conformity with 1789 state
procedures, but provided for independent federal regulation of procedure in equity and
admiralty proceedings.  Act of May 8, 1792, c. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276.  A thorough
examination of the legislative evolution of the rule-making power with respect to the federal
courts is beyond the scope of this memorandum. For a discussion of the evolution of the
rules of procedure applicable in U.S. district courts, see Charles Alan Wright, The Law of
Federal Courts, ch. 10, at 399-411 (1983).   
In Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat (23 U.S.) 1 (1825), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the constitutional sufficiency of the congressional delegation to the federal courts of the
power to establish rules of practice in the 1789 and 1792 acts, as an exercise of the
necessary and proper clause, so long as those rules are not contrary to the laws of the United
States.  For a more in depth discussion of the Wayman case, see Congressional Research
Service, The Constitution of the United States of America, Analysis and Interpretation, S.
Doc. 103-6, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 75-76, 644 (1996)(hereinafter Constitution Annotated).
An updated version of this treatise is available on the CRS website, at
[http://www.crs.gov/products//index.shtml]). See also, Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S.
1 (1941)(holding that Congress has the power to regulate the procedure and practice of the
federal courts and may delegate to the Supreme Court or other federal courts the power to
make rules not inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution or statutes).  It is worthy of note that,
under the express terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), statutes in conflict with rules promulgated
under Section 2072 at the time those rules go into effect have no further force or effect.
23 In the order transmitting proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to the Speaker of the House by Chief Justice Rehnquist on April 23, 2001, on behalf of the
U.S. Supreme Court, the Court also approved the abrogation of the Rules of Practice and
Procedure under section 25 of An Act To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting
Copyright (March 4, 1909), promulgated by the Court on June 1, 1909, as revised.
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures [sic], Communication from the Chief
Justice, the Supreme Court of the United States Transmitting Amendment to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that have been Adopted by the Court, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2072,
H. Doc. 107-61, at 1,3 (April 24, 2001).  
On the other hand, Congress has delegated much of its court rule-making
authority to the federal courts.20 For example, in the Judiciary Act of 1789,21
Congress gave the federal courts power “to make and establish all necessary rules for
the orderly conducting of business in said courts, provided such rules are not
repugnant to the laws of the United States.”22 Pursuant to these statutory authorities,
the United States Supreme Court has promulgated rules of civil procedure (including
supplemental rules for admiralty and maritime cases), habeas corpus, criminal
procedure, evidence, appellate procedure, and bankruptcy.23  Where Congress has
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24 Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, Congress had never used
the report and weight provisions of the Rules Enabling Act to delay, block, or change rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court. When the Supreme Court proposed the Federal Rules of
Evidence, however, Congress intervened to postpone the effective date of the rules, and two
years later promulgated its own version of the rules.  Todd Peterson, Controlling the Federal
Courts Through the Appropriations Process, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 993, 1030-31 (1998). 
25 Article III, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution states, in part, “The Judges, both of the Supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated
Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office.”
26 See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980); United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S.557
(2000).
27 Article II, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he President, Vice President
and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”
28 This number does not include Judge George W. English, District Judge for the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois.  The House impeached Judge
English and voted articles of impeachment against him, and the House Managers appeared
before the Senate to advise the Senate of the House action and to begin the process which
would lead to a Senate trial.  When Judge English resigned from office six days before his
trial was scheduled to begin in the Senate, the House voted to discontinue the proceedings,
and the Senate terminated the impeachment proceedings.
29  See CRS Report 98-882:  Impeachment Grounds: A Collection of Selected Materials, by
Charles Doyle (October 29, 1998) (available from author). These proceedings have only
rarely been subject to litigation. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993),
affirming, 938 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1991), affirming, 744 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1990); compare
with Hastings v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 490 (D.D.C. 1990), vacated and remanded on
court’s own motion, 988 F.2d 1280 (Table Case), 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 11592
(1993)(unpublished per curiam vacating and remanding for reconsideration in light of Nixon
(continued...)
deemed it appropriate, it has by statute rejected or amended proposed rules, delayed
the effective dates of proposed rules, or drafted and enacted court rules itself.24 
B. Over Federal Judges
The remainder of Section 1 of Article III contains two critical provisions
regarding federal judges. First is “good behavior” tenure,25 which effectively has
come to mean lifetime tenure for Article III judges subject to removal only through
conviction on impeachment. The second provision relates to security of
compensation, meaning that a federal judge’s compensation may “not be diminished
during their continuance in office,” although, as controversies over the years have
shown, the compensation need not be sufficient within the judges’ understanding.26
Impeachment, which is addressed in Article II of the Constitution, applies to all
civil officers of the United States in both the executive and judicial branches.27
However, a majority of the fifteen28 officials who have been impeached in the House
of Representatives and tried in the Senate, and all of the seven convicted and
removed from office, have been judges.29 The imposition of punishment for judicial
CRS-6
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v. United States, supra). 
30 Judicial discipline was established by the Judicial Misconduct and Disability Act of 1980
at former 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) and later replaced by similar provisions appearing at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 351-361. The Judicial Improvements Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-273, Division C, Title I,
Subtitle C. The constitutional sufficiency of the 1980 act has been upheld at the lower court
level.  See, e.g., Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability Orders of
Judicial Conference of the United States v. McBryde, 264 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir.), cert. den.,
123 S. Ct. 99 (2002); Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 829 F.2d 91
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014 (1988); Matter of Certain Complaints under
Investigation by an Investigating Committee of Judicial Council of Eleventh Circuit, 783
F.2d 1488, 1499-1515 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom Hastings v. Godbold, 477 U.S. 904
(1986). The Supreme Court has yet to pass on the validity of either Act or of any exercise
of the judicial discipline power under the Act. But compare Chandler v. Judicial Council,
382 U.S. 1003 (1966); Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74 (1970)(a pre-Act case).
31  Currently, disciplinary actions that can be imposed by the judiciary’s Judicial Council of
the Circuits include 1) ordering that, on a temporary basis for a time certain, no further cases
be assigned to a judge; 2) censuring or reprimanding a judge by means of private
communication; 3) censuring or reprimanding a judge by means of public announcement;
4) certifying disability of a judge pursuant to the procedures and standards provided under
section 372(b); or 5) requesting that a judge voluntarily retire.
misconduct by the federal judiciary has also been addressed by statute,30 but these
provisions do not provide for the removal of a judge or Justice from office.31
That Congress “may from time to time ordain and establish inferior courts” may
be thought to imply that Congress may expand and contract the units of the system.
But what happens to the judges who occupy posts on the courts that are abolished or
reduced in the number of judges?  This was the question that occurred with the repeal
of the Judiciary Act of 1801, but no resolution of the issue was achieved at that time.
Congress did not exercise this power again until 1913, when it abolished the special
Commerce Court, which had proved disappointing to its sponsors. In 1913, Congress
provided for the redistribution of the judges of the Commerce Court among the
circuit courts.  Since then, as Congress has rearranged some courts, it has always
provided for the same kind of redistribution, usually assigning judges to those courts
that received the jurisdiction of the abolished courts.
II. Limits on Congress’ Constitutional Powers
A. Textual Limitations
On its face, there is no limit on the power of Congress to make exceptions to
and regulate the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, to create inferior federal
courts and to specify their jurisdiction. However, that is true of the Constitution’s
other grants of legislative authority in Article I and elsewhere, but this does not
prevent the application of other constitutional principles to those powers. “[T]he
Constitution is filled with provisions that grant Congress or the States specific power
to legislate in certain areas,” Justice Black wrote for the Court in a different context,
but “these granted powers are always subject to the limitations that they may not be
CRS-7
32 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968).
33 United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 399-400 (1908).
34 Laurence Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the
Federal Courts, 16 Harv. C.R.- C.L.L. Rev. 129, 142-43 (1981). For instance, segregation
in courtrooms is unlawful and may not be enforced through contempt citations for
disobedience,  Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963), or through other means. Treatment
of parties to or witnesses in judicial actions based on their race is impermissible. Hamilton
v. Alabama, 376 U.S. 650 (1964)(reversing contempt conviction of witness who refused to
answer questions so long as prosecutor addressed her by her first name). 
35 The Fifth Amendment provides that no “private property [ ] be taken for public use
without just compensation.”
36 For instance, the Supreme Court has declared categorically that “the legislative power of
Congress cannot be delegated.” United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S.
77, 85 (1932). The categorical statement has never been literally true, the Court having
upheld the delegation at issue in the very case in which the statement was made (the Court
in the cited case upheld the power of the Food and Drug Administration to allow reasonable
variations, tolerances, and exemptions from misbranding prohibitions). The Court has long
recognized that administration of the law requires exercise of discretion, and that “in our
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems,
Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general
(continued...)
exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution.”32 The
elder Justice Harlan seems to have had the same thought in mind when he said that,
with respect to Congress’ power over jurisdiction of the federal courts, “what such
exceptions and regulations should be it is for Congress, in its wisdom, to establish,
having of course due regard to all the Constitution.”33
Thus, it is clear that while Congress has significant authority over administration
of the judicial system, it may not exercise its authority over the courts in a way that
violates the Fifth Amendment due process clause or that violates precepts of equal
protection.  For instance, Congress could not limit access to the judicial system based
on race or ethnicity.34 Nor, without amendment of the Constitution, could Congress
provide that the courts may take property while denying a right to compensation
under the takings clause.35  In general, the mere fact Congress is exercising its
authority over the courts does not serve to insulate such legislation from
constitutional scrutiny. 
B. Separation of Powers
It is also clear that Congress may not exercise its authority over the courts in a
way that violates precepts of separation of powers. The doctrine of separation of
powers is not found in the text of the Constitution, but has been discerned by courts,
scholars and others in the allocation of power in the first three Articles, i.e., the
“legislative power” is vested in Congress, the “executive power” is vested in the
President, and the “judicial power” is vested in the Supreme Court and the inferior
federal courts.  That interpretation is also consistent with the speeches and writings
of the framers. But while the rhetoric of the Supreme Court points to a strict
separation of the three powers, its actual holdings are far less decisive.36
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directives.”  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).  See also Whitman v.
American Trucking Assn., Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
37 424 U.S. 1, 109-43 (1976)
38 It is true that the Court has wavered between two approaches to cases raising
separation-of-powers claims, using a strict approach in some cases and a less rigid balancing
approach in others.  Nevertheless, the Court looks to a test that evaluates whether the
moving party, usually Congress, has “impermissibly undermine[d]” the power of another
branch or has “impermissibly aggrandize[d]” its own power at the expense of another
branch; whether, that is, the moving party has “disrupt[ed] the proper balance between the
coordinate branches [by] preventing the [other] Branch from accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned functions.” Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988).  See also
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for
the Abatement of Airport Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
39 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986);
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
40 See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); Morrison
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Commodities Future Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 US. 833
(1986); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
41 Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).  For further
discussion of the separation of powers doctrine, see generally CRS Report RL30249, The
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Nevertheless, beginning with Buckley v. Valeo,37 the Supreme Court has
reemphasized separation of powers as a vital element in American federal
government.38
The two approaches that the Court has used in its separation of powers cases
have been characterized as a formalist or strict approach and as a functionalist
approach.  A formalist or strict approach examines the text of the Constitution to
determine the degree to which branch powers and functions may be intermingled,
emphasizing that powers committed by the Constitution to a particular branch are to
be exercised exclusively by that branch.  Such an approach looks to a textual analysis
to determine whether and the extent to which the actions of one branch aggrandize
the power of that branch or encroach upon that of another branch.39  In contrast to
such a textual analysis, the more flexible functionalist approach to separation of
powers focuses upon the preservation of the core functions of the three branches,
looking in a given case to whether the exercise of power by one branch impinges
upon a core function of a coordinate branch.40  In articulating its functionalist
approach in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, the Court stated that, where
a question arose as to whether an Act of Congress
 . . . disrupts the proper balance between coordinate branches, the proper inquiry
focuses upon the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. . . .  Only where the
potential for disruption is present must we then determine whether that impact




Separation of Powers Doctrine:  An Overview of its Rationale and Application, by T.J.
Halstead; Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s Prerogative over Agencies and Agency
Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration’s Theory of the
Unitary Executive, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 627 (1989); Peter R. Strauss, Formal and
Functional Approaches to Separation of Powers Questions: A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72
Cornell L. Rev. 488 (1987); Constitution Annotated, supra note 22, at 65-70.
42  2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 409 (1792). This case was not actually decided by the Supreme Court,
but by several Justices on circuit. 
43  Those principles remain vital. See, e.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S. S. Corp.,
333 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1948)(“Judgments within the powers vested in courts by the Judiciary
Article of the Constitution may not lawfully be revised, overturned or refused faith and
credit by another Department of Government.”); Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971).
44  Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
45  Such proposals from the 108th Congress include H.R. 3799, the Constitution Restoration
Act of 2004 (limiting federal court jurisdiction over cases regarding governmental
acknowledgment of God); H.R. 1546, the Life-Protecting Judicial Limitation Act of 2003
(providing that the inferior courts of the United States do not have jurisdiction to hear
(continued...)
The federal courts have long held that Congress may not act to denigrate the
authority of the judicial branch. In the 1782 decision in Hayburn’s Case,42 several
Justices objected to a congressional enactment that authorized the federal courts to
hear claims for disability pensions for veterans. The courts were to certify their
decisions to the Secretary of War, who was authorized either to award each pension
or to refuse it if he determined the award was an “imposition or mistaken.” The
Justices on circuit contended that the law was unconstitutional because the judicial
power was committed to a separate department and because the subjecting of a
court’s opinion to revision or control by an officer of the executive or the legislative
branch was not authorized by the Constitution. Congress thereupon repealed the
objectionable features of the statute.43  More recently, the doctrine of separation of
powers has been applied to prevent Congress from vesting jurisdiction over
common-law bankruptcy claims in non-Article III courts.44
III.  Congressional Power Over Court Jurisdiction
Allocation of court jurisdiction by Congress is complicated by the presence of
state court systems that can and in some cases do hold concurrent jurisdiction over
cases involving questions of federal statutory and constitutional law. Thus, the power
of Congress over the federal courts is really the power to determine how federal cases
are to be allocated among state courts, federal inferior courts, and the United States
Supreme Court. Congress has significant authority to determine which of these
various courts will adjudicate such cases, and the method by which this will occur.
For most purposes, the exercise of this power is relatively noncontroversial.
Over the years, however, various proposals have been made to limit the
jurisdiction of federal courts to hear cases in particular areas of law such as busing,
abortion, prayer in school, and most recently, reciting the Pledge of Allegiance.45
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abortion-related cases); S. 1297, the Protect the Pledge Act of 2003 (same); S. 1558, the
Religious Liberties Restoration Act (amending jurisdiction of federal courts over cases
involving the Pledge of Allegiance, display of the Ten Commandments, or use of the motto
“In God we Trust”); and H.R. 3190, the Safeguarding our Religious Liberties Act (same).
46  This amendment provided that “None of the funds appropriated in this Act may be used
to enforce the judgment in Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002).”  149
Cong Rec H 7247 (July 22, 2003) (amending H.R. 2799). The amendment appears to have
been intended to prevent enforcement of the above-cited case, which held that because of
the use of the words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, a California school district’s
policy of sponsoring a teacher-led recitation of the Pledge was unconstitutional. Proposed
by Representative Hostettler as an amendment to H.R. 2799 (the proposed 2004
Appropriations Act for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies), this language was adopted by the House.  149 Cong Rec H 7298 (July
22, 2003).  It was not, however, included in H.R. 2673, the Consolidated Appropriations Act
of 2004. See Conference Report on H.R. 2673, 149 Cong. Rec. H12335-12352 (November
25, 2003).
47 “No court created by Act of Congress shall have any jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court
shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or decide any question pertaining to the
interpretation of, or the validity under the Constitution of, section 1738C or this section.”
H.R. 3313, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess. For further information on the Defense of Marriage Act,
see CRS Report RL31994, Same-Sex Marriages: Legal Issues, Alison M. Smith.
48 “No court created by Act of Congress shall have any jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court
shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or decide any question pertaining to the
interpretation of, or the validity under the Constitution of, the Pledge of Allegiance, as
defined in section 4 of title 4, or its recitation.” However, “[t]he limitation in this section
shall not apply to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia or the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals.” H.R. 2028, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess.
49  For further information on the issue of congressional regulation of federal judicial power,
see Constitution Annotated, supra note 22, 779-784 (1992).
Generally, proponents of these proposals are critical of specific decisions made by
the federal courts in that particular substantive area, and the proposals are usually
intended to express disagreement with decisions in those areas and/or to influence the
results or applications of such cases.
Several such proposals passed the House in the 108th Congress. For instance, in
July 2003, an amendment was passed by the House to limit the use of funds to
enforce a federal court decision regarding the Pledge of Allegiance.46  Then, in July
2004, the House passed H.R. 3313, the Marriage Protection Act, which would have
limited Federal court jurisdiction over questions regarding the Defense of Marriage
Act.47  Finally, in September 2004, the House passed H.R. 2028, the Pledge
Protection Act, which was intended to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
hear cases regarding the Pledge of Allegiance.48  These proposals are often referred
to as “court-stripping” proposals, and some of these proposals may raise significant
constitutional questions.49 
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50  U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 1. Even with respect to the grants of original jurisdiction, Congress
has some statutory authority.  While the Constitution has given the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction over cases to which a state is a party, by statute in 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a),
Congress has made the jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court over all controversies
between two or more States exclusive. Under the Court’s holding in Ames v. Kansas, 111
U.S. 449 (1884), the original jurisdiction conferred on that Court by Article III, § 2, cl. 2,
of the U.S. Constitution was not made exclusive by operation of that constitutional
provision.  Rather, Congress has the power to grant or deny exclusiveness.  In subsection
1251(b), Congress, by statute, provided that the Supreme Court would have original, but not
exclusive, jurisdiction of “all actions or proceedings to which ambassadors, other public
ministers, consuls, or vice consuls of foreign states are parties;” “all controversies between
the United States and a State;” and “all actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens
of another State or against aliens.”
51 “The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority; — to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls; — to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which
the United States shall be a Party; — to Controversies between two or more States; between
a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States, —  between
Citizens of the same State claiming Land under Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.” U.S. CONST. Art. III,
§ 2, cl. 1.
52  “In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.” U.S.
CONST. Art. I, § 2, cl. 2.  “Original Jurisdiction” is a when a court has jurisdiction to hear
a case without it having been heard previously in a lower court. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1251,
however, only disputes between states are considered exclusively by the Supreme Court.
(continued...)
A. The Allocation of Federal Judicial Power
 As noted, Article III provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.”50  Article III also identifies the cases covered
by this judicial power by two separate criteria — the subject matter of particular
cases or the identity of the litigants or persons affected.  The subject matter of the
federal judicial power is quite broad, as it includes the power to consider “all” cases
arising under either the Constitution, federal law or treaty, or arising from the
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction. As noted, Article III also extends the federal
judicial power to cases based on the types of parties affected or involved.  These
latter cases can be divided into two different groups. 
The first group includes “all” cases which affect an Ambassador or other public
Ministers or Consuls, or which involve a controversy between two or more States.
The second group includes cases involving disputes between the United States and
another party; a state and citizens of another State; citizens of different States;
citizens of the same state claiming land under grants of different states; and between
a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.51  The cases
in the first group, and any other cases where a State is a party, are to be heard directly
by the Supreme Court under the Court’s original jurisdiction.52  The remaining cases
CRS-12
52 (...continued)
Thus, original cases in the Supreme Court are few, but are often complex. When the Court
exercises original jurisdiction, it generally appoints a special Master to do the fact finding
in the case.  Richard Fallon, Daniel Meltzer, David Shapiro, HART & WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 55 (1996).
53  “In all other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact . . . .” U.S. CONST. Article III, §2, cl. 2. Most of the cases appealed
to the Supreme Court are first heard in a federal courts of appeals or state courts. The large
majority of these cases are heard by the Court pursuant to writs of certiorari. See Richard
Fallon, Daniel Meltzer, David Shapiro, supra note 52, at 55.
54  “In all other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make.” U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2.
55  “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST., Art. VI, cl. 2.
56  The Constitution appears to contain no authority to create state courts. Martin v. Hunter’s
Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 331 (1816).
57 See Richard Fallon, Daniel Meltzer, David Shapiro, supra note 52, at 636- 644.
in the second group, along with the Court’s previously noted substantive authority,
are heard under the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.53 
It is important to note that the Court’s appellate jurisdiction (unlike its original
jurisdiction) is subject to “Exceptions, and under such Regulations” as Congress shall
make.54 It should also be noted, however, that the Constitution provides for
jurisdiction in “all” cases under its substantive jurisdiction or under the first group
of cases based on parties. As will be discussed later, this has led some commentators
to suggest that while Congress has the power to limit the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction, that at least some cases must be considered by some federal court,
whether it be the Supreme Court or an inferior court.
The Supremacy Clause, found in Article VI, provides that the judges in every
state are bound to follow the United States Constitution and applicable federal law.55
Congress does not appear to have the authority to establish state courts of competent
jurisdiction.56 However, once such state courts exist,  Congress can endow them with
concurrent power to consider certain cases concerning federal law.  When a state
court has rendered a decision on an issue of federal law, and a final determination has
been made by the highest court in that state, then that case may generally be appealed
to the Supreme Court.57  Thus, state court cases can also fall under the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
The question arises, however, precisely how the “judicial power” should be
allocated between the various courts, and what sort of limitations can be
implemented on the combined court systems by Congress.  While there have been
many proposals to vary federal court jurisdiction in order to affect a particular
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58 It should be noted that, unlike the limiting of federal court jurisdiction, that the limiting
of state court jurisdiction to consider federal constitutional issues is well established.
59 See, e.g., Life-Protecting Judicial Limitation Act of 2003, H.R. 1546, 108th Cong,1st Sess.
(providing that the inferior courts of the United States do not have jurisdiction to hear
abortion-related cases); Pledge Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 2028, 108th Cong., 1st Sess.
(no jurisdiction of inferior federal courts over cases involving the Pledge of Allegiance);
Protect the Pledge Act of 2003, S. 1297, 108th Congress, 1st Sess. (same).
60 See, e.g., The Marriage Protection Act H.R. 3313, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess. (limiting federal
court review of the Defense of Marriage Act); The Pledge Protection Act, H.R. 2028, 108th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (limiting federal court review of cases involving the validity of the Pledge
of Allegiance); A Bill to Modify the Jurisdiction of the Federal courts with Respect to
Abortion, H.R. 1624, 104th Cong.,1st Sess. (limiting federal court jurisdiction over
abortion).
61 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
62 See, e g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000)(upholding the Prison Litigation Reform
Act). See also 28 U.S.C. 1341 (a district courts may not enjoin the collection of tax under
State law where a remedy is available in the court system).
judicial result, few have become law, and even fewer have been subjected to scrutiny
by the courts.  Further, those laws that did pass varied from modern proposals. Thus,
the answer to these complex questions must be ascertained by reference to
constitutional text, historical practice, a limited set of case law, and scholarly
commentary.
Federal district courts and courts of appeal (the inferior federal courts) are
authorized to consider most questions of federal statutory and constitutional law, with
appeal to the Supreme Court. In general, most modern “court-stripping” proposals
appear to be intended to increase state court involvement in constitutional cases by
decreasing federal court involvement. There are at least three possible variations to
these proposals.58  First, there are proposals which, by limiting inferior federal court
jurisdiction, would, in effect, cause a particular class of constitutional decisions to
be heard in state courts, with appeal to the Supreme Court.59  Second, there have been
proposals to vest exclusive jurisdiction to hear such constitutional cases in the state
courts without appeal to the Supreme Court.60 Third, proposals may exclude any
judicial review over a particular class of constitutional cases from any court, whether
state or federal.
 It should be noted that at least one court-stripping proposal does not limit the
court’s jurisdiction, but rather limits the remedy available. To the extent that these
remedy limitations actually prevent the vindication of established constitutional
injury, they would appear to fall under the same category as proposals that limit the
jurisdiction of particular courts. Thus, for instance, the amendment noted above
which would prohibit the use of funds for enforcement of a particular district court
decision,61 would seem likely to be analyzed similarly to an amendment limiting
lower court jurisdiction over constitutional cases. As will be discussed later,
however, in situations where some sufficient remedies remain, a court might
determine that the constitutional right could be effectuated despite such limits.62 
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63  Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. (5 U.S.) 137 (1803).
64  See notes 32-44 and accompanying text, supra.
65 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000)(striking down Congressional
statute purporting to overturn the Court’s Fourth Amendment ruling in Miranda v. Arizona);
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997)(Congress’ enforcement power under the
Fourteenth Amendment does not extend to the power to alter the Constitution); Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 225 (Congress may not disturb final court rulings).
66 See note 36-44 and accompanying text, supra.
67 See, e.g., The Protection of Marriage Act, H.R. 3313, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess. The
proposed Act provided that “no court created by Act of Congress shall have any jurisdiction,
and the Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or decide any question
pertaining to the interpretation of, or the validity under the Constitution of, section 1738C
or this section.”
68 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
B. Limiting Judicial Review
Under the doctrine of judicial review, federal and state courts review the
constitutionality of legislation passed by Congress and state legislatures.63  There are
few examples of Congress attempting to use its power over federal court jurisdiction
to limit judicial review of substantive constitutional law, and no examples of
Congress successfully precluding federal courts from an entire area of constitutional
concern.  Most commentators agree that the constitutional problems with “court-
stripping” provisions do not just arise from an analysis of the extent of Congress’
Article III powers, but must also address an examination of constitutional limitations
on this authority.64  
The Court has struck down attempts by Congress to pass legislation intended to
directly overturn constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court.65  It would seem
unlikely that the Supreme Court would allow Congress to achieve the same results
using Congress’ power over jurisdiction and procedure. As noted previously,
legislation that has the effect of encroaching upon the Judicial Branch or
aggrandizing Congress’s authority may be limited by the doctrine of separation of
powers.66  In particular, significant issues of separation of powers issue might arise
if Congress attempted to prevent the Supreme Court from reviewing the
constitutionality of legislation that Congress had passed.67 
In United States v. Klein,68 Congress passed a law designed to frustrate a finding
of the Supreme Court as to the effect of a presidential pardon. The Court struck down
the law, essentially holding that Congress had an illegitimate purpose in passage of
the law.  “[T]he language of the proviso shows plainly that it does not intend to
withhold appellate jurisdiction except as a means to an end. Its great and controlling
purpose is to deny to pardons granted by the President the effect which this court had
adjudged them to have. . . . It seems to us that this is not an exercise of the
acknowledged power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to
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69 80 U.S. at 146. The Court also found that the statue impaired the effect of a presidential
pardon, and thus “infring[ed] the constitutional power of the Executive.” Id. at 147.
70 See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 350-51 (2000)(Souter, J., concurring).
71 See, e.g., Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938)(Article III allows for Norris-
LaGuardia Act limitations on jurisdiction of federal court to grant relief for labor disputes);
But see Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 339 (1921)(state limitations on injunctions for
labor disputes violate Equal Protection Clause). 
72 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-636 (1995)(animus against a particular group not a
legitimate governmental interest).
73 See Richard H. Fallon, Daniel J. Meltzer, David L. Shapiro, supra note 52, at 351-354.
the appellate power.”69  Similarly, a law which was specifically intended to limit the
ability of a court to adjudicate or remedy a constitutional violation could violate the
doctrine of separation of powers, as providing relief from unconstitutional acts is a
judicial branch function.70
When specific constitutional rights are singled out by Congress for disparate
treatment, a question also arises as to whether that class of litigants is being treated
in a manner inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause. As noted earlier, it is
generally agreed that a law that limited a federal court’s power for an illegitimate
purpose, such as to deny access to the courts based on race, would run afoul of
provisions of the Constitution apart from Article III.  But, what if members of a
group being excluded from the courts were not defined by membership in a suspect
class, but instead by their status as plaintiffs in a particular type of constitutional
case?
In general, Article III allows Congress to provide different legal procedural rules
for different types of cases if there is a rational reason to do so.71  However, even a
rational basis analysis of such disparate treatment might not be met if the Court finds
the argument put forward for burdening a particular class of cases is illegitimate.72
As mere disagreement with the results reached by the federal courts in prior cases
regarding the Constitution may not be viewed as a legitimate legislative justification,
alternative justifications for such laws would need to be established before such a
rational basis test would be met.
It should be noted, however, that not all variations of the courts’ jurisdiction
absolutely limit the rights of litigants to have constitutional issues reviewed by some
court. Thus, an evaluation of a particular piece of “court-stripping” legislation may
vary depending on what jurisdiction, remedies or procedures are affected, and what
ultimate impact this is likely to have on the specified constitutional rights.  Thus, the
question may well turn on how such legislation burdened a particular group or
impaired a fundamental right. For instance, requiring litigants in particular federal
constitutional cases to pursue their cases in state courts may not represent a
significant burden,73 and thus might require less legislative justification.  However,
more serious attempts to impair either the burden of litigation or the remedies
available might well require the establishment of a more significant governmental
interest before such a law could be enforced.
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74 1 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 124 (1911).
75 Paul Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Court, 27 Vill. L.
Rev. 1030, 1031 (1982).
76 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
77  14 U.S. at 330-331.
78 Modern examples of exclusive federal jurisdiction include the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78aa (exclusive federal jurisdiction to enforce criminal and civil
liabilities created by Act); 28 U.S.C. 1333 (exclusive federal for admiralty, maritime and
cases involving prizes); and 28 U.S.C. 1338 (federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in
suits arising under the patent, copyright, and trademark laws).
C. Eliminating Inferior Federal Court Review.
Various proposals have been made that would eliminate lower federal court
review over certain constitutional issues, leaving such decisions to state courts, with
Supreme Court review. The argument has been made that because Congress has the
authority to decide whether or not to create inferior federal courts, it also has
authority to determine which issues these courts may consider.  There appears to be
significant historical support for this position. While the establishment of a federal
Supreme Court was agreed upon early in the Constitutional Convention, the
establishment of inferior federal courts was not a foregone conclusion. At one point,
it was proposed that the Convention eliminate a provision establishing such inferior
courts.  This proposal would have had state tribunals consider most federal cases,
while providing Supreme Court review in order to enforce national rights and ensure
uniformity of judgments.74 
James Madison opposed the motion to eliminate lower federal courts, arguing
that such a decentralized system would result in an oppressive number of appeals,
and would subject federal law to the local biases of state judges. A compromise
resolution, proposed by Madison and others, was agreed to, whereby Congress would
be allowed, but not compelled, to create courts inferior to the Supreme Court.  The
new plan, referred to as the “Madisonian Compromise,” was ultimately adopted.
Thus, Article III provides that Congress has the power to create courts inferior to the
Supreme Court.
Once Congress has agreed to the creation of inferior courts, however, the
question then arises as to whether it must grant these courts the full extent of the
jurisdiction contemplated by Article III.  Some commentators have argued that the
very nature of the Madisonian Compromise described above plainly allowed the
establishment of federal courts with something less than the full judicial power
available under Article III.75 A 1816 decision by Justice Story, Martin v. Hunter’s
Lessee,76 however, suggests that the Constitution requires that if inferior courts are
established, there are some aspects of the judicial power which Congress may not
abrogate.  For instance, Justice Story argued that Congress would need to vest
inferior courts with jurisdiction to hear cases that are not amenable to state court
jurisdiction.77 Thus, arguably, a constitutional issue which arose under a law within
the exclusive federal jurisdiction78 would need to be decided by a federal court.
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79 See Richard H. Fallon, Daniel J. Meltzer, David L. Shapiro, supra note 52, at 2. Section
11of the 1789 Judiciary Act did not confer general federal question jurisdiction ( jurisdiction
arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties) on the inferior federal courts, but rather
conferred diversity jurisdiction (with some limits) and a few other grants, So, absent the
ability of litigants to obtain original jurisdiction in the inferior federal courts under some
other jurisdictional basis, the constitutionality of federal statutes could not be attacked in
these courts. Some few instances of federal question jurisdiction appear in the historical
record, but it was not until 1875 when Congress conferred general federal question
jurisdiction on the inferior federal courts, subject to a jurisdictional amount limitation. 18
Stat. 470.
80 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
81 49 U.S. at 448.
82 49 U.S. at 449.
There is significant historical precedent, however, for the proposition that there
is no requirement that all jurisdiction that could be vested in the federal courts must
be so vested. For instance, the First Judiciary Act implemented under the
Constitution, the Judiciary Act of 1789, is considered to be an indicator of the
original understanding of the Article III powers. That Act, however, falls short of
having implemented all of the “judicial powers” which were specified under Article
III.  For instance, the Act did not provide jurisdiction for the inferior federal courts
to consider cases arising under federal law or the Constitution. Although the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction did extend to such cases when they originated in state
courts, its review was limited to where a claimed statutory or constitutional right had
been denied by the court below.79
There is also Supreme Court precedent that holds that Congress need not vest
the lower courts with all jurisdiction authorized by Article III.  In Sheldon v. Sill,80
the Court was asked to evaluate whether  Congress need grant a federal circuit court
jurisdiction in a case where diversity (jurisdiction based on parties being from
different states) had been manufactured by assignment of a mortgage to a person in
another state. The Court held that “Congress, having the power to establish the
courts, must define their respective jurisdictions.”81  The Court further indicated that
“Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the
enumerated controversies” so that “a statute which does prescribe the limits of their
jurisdiction, cannot be in conflict with the Constitution, unless it confers powers not
enumerated therein.”82 
As noted earlier, the Supremacy Clause provides that state courts are bound to
follow the United States Constitution, so that state courts which have cases within
their jurisdiction are required to consider and decide such constitutional issues as
they arise.  Congress does not have the authority to establish the jurisdiction of state
courts, and consequently those “court stripping” proposals that relate to the inferior
federal courts do not generally specify that state courts will become the primary
courts for vindication of specified constitutional rights.  To the extent, however, that
state courts provide a forum for the complete vindication of constitutional rights, then
concerns about removal of such issues from a federal court are diminished.
However, as noted earlier, such “court stripping” proposals would still need to meet
requirements of equal protection, due process, or separation of powers.
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83 See supra note 79.
84  1 Stat. 85.
85 W. Casto, The First Congress's Understanding of Its Authority Over the Federal Courts'
Jurisdiction, 26 B.C. L. Rev. 1101, 1118-20 (1985).
86 The law, incidentally, was not changed until 1914, 38 Stat. 790, as a result of the decision
in Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911), invalidating a regulatory
measure under a Lochner-like application of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause. One may wonder how often this kind of thing happened if the law was not changed
for 85 years.
D. Eliminating Inferior and Supreme Court Review
Other proposals noted above would eliminate all federal court review of certain
constitutional issues, leaving these decision to be finally decided by various state
courts. Elimination by Congress of all federal question review over a particular
constitutional question by the Supreme Court appears to be unprecedented.  While
there was a time when inferior federal courts did not have general federal
jurisdiction,83 constitutional challenges against a state’s actions could still be brought
in the state courts, with appellate review in the Supreme Court. 
 Initially, the Supreme Court’s appellate review was limited to only certain
procedural postures. Under § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,84 there were three
categories of appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court available:
  1. Where the validity of a treaty, statute, or authority of the United States is
drawn into question and the state court's decision is against their validity.
  2. Where the validity of a state statute or authority is challenged on the basis of
federal law and the state court's decision is in favor of their validity.
3. Where a state court construes a United States constitution, treaty, statute, or
commission and decides against a title, privilege, or exemption under any of
them.85
The first category of appellate jurisdiction was clearly intended to promote a
national, uniform resolution of questions of the validity of federal laws or treaties by
providing Supreme Court review where a federal law or treaty was invalidated. Thus,
if a federal law was found to violate the Constitution, the case could be reviewed by
the Supreme Court. Similarly, if a federal law and a state law conflicted, and the state
law was upheld, the litigant could appeal to the Supreme Court, thus providing for
review of state laws upheld despite constitutional challenge.  Finally, where a state
court decided against a title, privilege, or exemption of a litigant based on federal
law, the Court could hear the case. Only if a state court upheld a federal law or treaty,
or struck a state law as inconsistent with federal law did the Supreme Court lack
jurisdiction. Thus, in those procedural postures where the federal interest was not
being challenged, § 25 would have the effect of insulating a federal law from a
constitutional attack.86
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87 As there were thirteen states when the Judiciary Act was passed in 1789, and around 40
states by 1875 (when the inferior federal courts were invested with federal question
jurisdiction), the possibility of conflicting constitutional decisions by states arising in that
period of time seems likely.
88 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
89 See note 50, supra.
Thus, while a constitutional challenge might be postponed because of the
procedural posture of a case, state and federal laws were not protected from appellate
review from the Supreme Court. For instance, if a state law was invalidated by a state
court as being in conflict with a federal law, precluding the losing party from
appealing that decision, no principle of res judicata or collateral estoppel would
prevent a challenge to such state laws being brought in other States.  If another state
court upheld such a state law, this decision could be appealed, and the precedent
would apply to the state where the first challenge was brought.87  Thus, there was no
general bar on such issues coming before the Supreme Court.
Whether a complete bar of federal court review of a constitutional issue could
be implemented by Congress first requires evaluation of two aspects of Article III:
the power of Congress to allocate federal judicial power and the power of Congress
to create exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under the
Exceptions Clause. As to the former, the question arises as to whether Congress need
allocate any of the authorities delineated in Article III to the federal courts beyond
cases decided under the “Original Jurisdiction” of the Supreme Court.  In Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee,88 Justice Story noted that the Constitution provides that the judicial
power “shall” be vested in the Supreme Court, or in the such inferior courts as are
created.  His opinion thus asserted that it is the duty of Congress to vest the “whole”
judicial power where it is so directed, either in the Supreme Court or in the inferior
courts. 
Justice Story did, however, note that the text of the Constitution suggests some
limits to the requirement that the “whole” judicial power shall vest.  This limit arises
from the previously noted fact that some types of federal “judicial power” are
extended by the text of the Constitution to “all” such cases, i.e., cases arising under
either the Constitution, federal law, treaty, admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, or
cases affecting an Ambassador or other public Ministers or Consuls.89  The vesting
of other types of cases cited in Article III (such as cases between citizens of different
States) is not so characterized, and thus arguably Congress would have discretion
whether or not to establish these powers in the federal courts.
Under this textual analysis, the power to consider cases concerning the
Constitution must be vested in some federal court. Thus, according to Justice Story,
a statute limiting consideration of specific constitutional issues to state courts with
no Supreme Court review would be unconstitutional. This analysis, however, has
attracted large amounts of scholarly attention, and there is significant dispute over
Justice Story’s conclusion. On one hand, at least one commentator asserts that not
only is the theory that some federal powers must be vested in the Supreme Court
supported by analysis of the text of the Constitution, but that it is also consistent with
jurisdictional limitations found in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and subsequent case
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91 Daniel Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1569 (1990).
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93 74 U.S. at 514.
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Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869).
law.90  Other commentators, however, have taken issue with this analysis.91  Absent
additional court precedent on this point, a resolution of this scholarly debate would
be largely speculative.
The second issue, whether Supreme Court review over a category of cases can
be limited by legislation under the Exceptions Clause, has been addressed to some
extent by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte McCardle.92  In Ex Parte McCardle,
Congress had authorized federal judges to issue writs of habeas corpus. McCardle,
the editor of the Vicksburg Times, was arrested by federal military authorities on the
basis of various editorials published in his newspaper, and charged with disturbing
the peace, libel, incitement and impeding Reconstruction. Claiming constitutional
infirmities with his case, McCardle sought and was denied a writ of habeas corpus
in an inferior federal court, a decision which he then appealed to the Supreme Court.
During the pendency of that appeal, however, in an apparent attempt to prevent the
Supreme Court from hearing the appeal, Congress repealed the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to hear appeals from habeas corpus decisions.
In McCardle, Congress purported to be acting under its authority under Article
III to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. In reviewing the
statute repealing the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, the Court noted that it was “not
at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature.  We can only examine its
power under the Constitution: and the power to make exceptions to the appellate
jurisdiction of this court is given by express words.”93  Consequently, the Supreme
Court accepted the withdrawal of jurisdiction over the defendant’s case, and
dismissed the appeal.
The case of Ex Parte McCardle, while it made clear the authority of Congress
to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, does not
appear to answer the question as to whether all Supreme Court review of a
constitutional issue can be eliminated. The Court specifically noted that McCardle
had other avenues of review to challenge the constitutionality of his arrest apart from
appellate review, namely the invocation of habeas corpus directly by the Supreme
Court.94 Consequently, unlike what would be provided for in some of the court-
stripping proposals noted previously, the Supreme Court in McCardle maintained the
ability to otherwise consider the underlying constitutional issues being raised.
As noted previously, it would also be the case that court-stripping proposals in
this category would raise significant questions of separation of powers.  For instance,
if Congress were to provide that the Supreme Court were unable to consider
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96 See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); Morrison
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Commodities Future Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 US. 833
(1986); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
97 See Richard H. Fallon, Daniel J. Meltzer, David L. Shapiro, supra note 52, at 351.
98 Id. at 366-67.
99  See, e.g., Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944).
100 29 U.S.C. § 201-219.
101 29 U.S.C. § 251-262. 
constitutional challenges to federal law, this would clearly raise the question of
whether Congress was moving to aggrandize Congressional power at the expense of
the judicial branch. As noted in section II(B) of this report, under a textual analysis,
such aggrandizement or encroachment can be the basis for a finding that such
legislation is unconstitutional.95 Even under a more flexible functionalist approach
to separation of powers, the question would arise as to whether such legislation
impinges upon a core function of a coordinate branch.96 
In sum, there is no direct court precedent on the issue of whether Congress can
eliminate all federal court jurisdiction over a constitutional issue, and little or no
consensus among scholars.  The practical consequences of enacting such proposals
is also unclear.  While it is presently the case that Supreme Court precedent binds
state courts, it is not clear if this would continue to be the effect if the states became
the court of final resort on a particular issue.97  Even if existing precedent was
adhered to, over time it could become the case that divergent constitutional doctrine
would arise in each of the fifty states on any issue where Supreme Court review was
precluded. Arguments have been made that such a result would undercut the
intention of the Founding Fathers to establish a uniform federal constitutional
scheme.98
E. Eliminating State and Federal Court Review
A series of lower federal court decisions seems to indicate that in most cases,
some forum must be provided for the vindication of constitutional rights, whether in
federal or state courts. For instance, in 1946, a series of Supreme Court decisions99
under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938100 exposed employers to five billion
dollars in damages, and the United States itself was threatened with liability for over
1.5 billion dollars. Subsequently, Congress enacted the Portal to Portal Act of
1947,101 which limited the jurisdiction of any court, state or federal, to impose
liability or impose punishment with respect to such liabilities.  Although the Act was
upheld by a series of federal district courts and courts of appeals, most of the courts
disregarded the purported jurisdictional limits, and decided the cases on the merits.
As one court noted, “while Congress has the undoubted power to give, withhold,
or restrict the jurisdiction of courts other than the Supreme Court, it must not exercise
that power as to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
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104 486 U.S. at 612-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105 Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 719-720 (1987)(Bork, J., dissenting).
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107 The creation of some courts lacking Article III judges is obviously desirable in some
instances.  One such instance is long established.  When Congress governs territories and
other possessions under Article IV, § 3, Clause 2, it must provide for courts, but the status
of these entities is far from permanent; that is, some territories may be slated for statehood,
others may be given independence, and some may stay dependent.  In all such instances,
Congress will want to maintain its discretion and not tie its hands by creating judges with
lifetime tenure.  Thus, in American Ins. Co. v. Cantor, 1 Pet. (26 U.S.) 511 (1828), Chief
Justice Marshall for the Court approved the authority of Congress to create such courts in
the territories, and those courts continue to this day in some entities. Cf., Nguyen v. United
States, 123 S. Ct. 2130 (2003).  Dicta in Territory of Guam v. Olsen, 431 U.S. 195, 201-02,
204 (1977), asserts that there may be limits to Congress’ discretion in creating territorial
courts and vesting them with judicial power.  The local courts of the District of Columbia
are Article I courts, although the history of these courts and their permissible powers is
checkered.  In addition, military courts have long been recognized as Article I (or II) courts.
108 The real controversy that has seen wavering and changing opinions by the Supreme Court
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or just compensation. . . .”102 The Court has also construed other similar statutes
narrowly so as to avoid “serious constitutional questions” that would arise if no
judicial forum for a constitutional claim existed.103
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether there needs to be a
judicial forum to vindicate all constitutional rights. Justice Scalia has pointed out that
there are particular cases, such as political questions cases, where all constitutional
review is in effect precluded.104  Other commentators point to sovereign immunity
and the ability of the government to limit the remedies available to plaintiffs.105
However, the Court has, in cases involving particular rights, generally found a
requirement that effective judicial remedies be present. Thus, for instance, the Court
has held that the Constitution mandates the availability of effective remedies for
takings.106  These cases would seem to indicate a basis for the Court to find that
parties seeking to vindicate other particular rights must have a judicial forum for such
challenges.
F. Vesting Judicial Power in Non-Article III Court.
Congress has occasionally sought to vest the “judicial power of the United
States” in tribunals whose judges do not have the attributes of Article III judges, that
is, good-behavior tenure and security of compensation.107  How is it possible to vest
the “judicial power of the United States” in Article I or Article IV tribunals or in
tribunals that are located in the executive branch?  The Court’s explanations have
varied over time, and it has vacillated over the permissibility of some such vesting.
The doctrine is far from settled.108
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has swirled about the ability of Congress to give non-Article III courts the power to
adjudicate general matters of federal legislation and constitutional questions.  In Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 458 U.S. 50 (1982), a sharply divided Court
held unconstitutional the vesting of jurisdiction over common-law claims arising under the
bankruptcy code in non-Article III courts, either Article I tribunals or adjuncts attached to
Article III courts.  The case is premised on the decision that the vesting of any but the most
limited amount of judicial power in non-Article III tribunals effected an unwarranted
encroachment upon the judicial power of the United States, a classic statement of the
doctrine of separation of powers as it emerged in the late 20th Century.  The dissenters did
not disavow the notion that Congress could encroach on the authority of the federal courts
by vesting the judicial power elsewhere, but they advocated a balancing test based on the
particular facts of each case to determine whether Congress had indeed impermissibly
interfered with another branch.  But the use of non-Article III tribunals has become too
widespread to maintain this position, and in subsequent cases, see Thomas v. Union Carbide,
473 U.S. 568 (1985); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), the Court backed away, finding
ways to sustain the vesting of judicial power in non-Article III tribunals without disavowing
Marathon.  Then, in Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), the Court
veered back toward Marathon.  Whatever these cases may stand for, they do recognize that
Congress may vest jurisdiction over matters of “public rights,” mainly under federal statutes,
in non-Article III tribunals.
109 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 331-32 (1966)(Court upheld the
provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that made a special, three-judge district court in
the District of Columbia the exclusive avenue of relief for states seeking to remove
themselves from the coverage of the Act).
110 While the courts have some inherent authority over its procedures, Congress has
regulated such processes as the power to hold persons in contempt, to issue writs, and many
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The importance of this doctrinal area for purposes of this report concerns the
power that Congress can exercise over legislative tribunals. Because the officeholders
of these tribunals lack Article III security, designed to maintain judicial
independence, Congress may limit tenure to a term of years, as it has done in acts
creating territorial and local District of Columbia courts and in such tribunals as the
Tax Court and others; and it may subject the judges of such courts to removal by the
President, and reduce their salaries during their terms.  Similarly, Congress can vest
nonjudicial functions in these courts that it may not vest in Article III courts.  It is
obvious that if there is congressional power to create non-Article III tribunals and
vest in them jurisdiction over “public rights” and other matters that are traditionally
the subject of Article III cases, then Congress has potential leverage vis-a-vis federal
courts that can alter federal separation of powers.
IV. Congressional Power Over Judicial Processes
and Remedies
Regulation of the procedures and remedies available to a litigant are clearly
within Congress’ authority.109 However, just as an exception or a regulation of
jurisdiction can constrain the courts in the performance of their duties, so restrictions
on judicial processes, such as the ability to afford injunctive relief, can equally
constrain the courts.110 While major interpretive differences have arisen between
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other matters since the Judiciary Act of 1789.
111 See, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 350-51 (2000)(Souter, J., concurring)(arguing
that application of Prison Litigation Reform Act would be a violation of separation of
powers doctrine if the time allowed for a court to decide a prison conditions case was
inadequate.)
112 Over many years, numerous exceptions to this law were judicially created, until, in
Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941), the Court in a lengthy opinion
largely wiped out these exceptions to restore what had been purported to be the original
intent. In contrast to the usual congressional-judicial confrontation, Congress immediately
amended the statute, announcing its intention to restore the pre-Toucey interpretation
affording the federal courts considerable discretion. See, 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
113 In other examples, Congress responded to the exercise of judicial power to enjoin federal
and state taxes and state rate-making proceedings. See 26 U.S.C. § 7421; 28 U.S.C. §§
1341-42.   In these contexts, Congress enacted separate statutes permitting court actions only
when complaining parties lacked the right to a complete and adequate remedy at law through
other avenues.
114 This often occurred during the era following the Court's decision in Lochner v. New York
198 U.S. 45 (1905)(striking down a law restricting employment in bakeries to ten hours per
day and 60 hours per week as a violation of the right to enter into a contract). See
Constitution Annotated, supra note 22, at 1582-83.
115 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15.
116 This process required the district court to determine that only through the injunctive
process could irremediable harm through illegal conduct be prevented.
117 See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
118 Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938)(“There can be no question of the
power of Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the
United States.”). But by the time Lauf was decided, however, Lochner was effectively dead;
as in so many of these precedents, the actual holding may not permit Congress to go as far
as it might wish.
Congress and the courts regarding the construction of these legislative enactments,
the Supreme Court has never expressed any doubt that Congress has the power to
enact them.  The Court has, however, always left open the possibility that Congress
might go too far.111
For instance, in 1793, for reasons lost to history, Congress enacted a statute to
prohibit the issuance of injunctions by federal courts to stay state court proceedings.
While construction of this statute has varied over the years,112 it remains as an
indication that Congress has the power to regulate such judicial process and
remedies.113 During this century, the propensity of the federal courts to issue
injunctions to limit labor unions in disputes with management,114 led Congress to
adopt the Norris-LaGuardia Act,115 forbidding the issuance of injunctions in labor
disputes except after compliance with a lengthy hearing and fact-finding process.116
Although earlier case law appeared to recognize a due process objection to such a
restraint,117 the Supreme Court had no difficulty sustaining the constitutionality of the
law in Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co.118 
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v. French, 536 U.S. 327, 360 (2000)(Justice Breyer dissenting).
120 319 U.S. 182 (1943). In Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), the Court upheld
the expansive provisions of the Act which conferred jurisdiction on the special court to hear
challenges to any order or regulation and foreclosed a plea of invalidity of any such order
or regulation as a defense to any criminal proceeding under the Act in any regular district
court, whether or not the person proceeded against had ever made use of the special court.
121 Outside the scope of a wartime price control measure, the Court has viewed similar
preclusions of judicial review as raising serious due process problems, resulting in a
construction that bypassed the constitutional issues. See, e.g., Adamo Wrecking Co. v.
United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1975);  United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987).
122 Another modern example involves prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief. A convicted
person is entitled to relief if a court finds that a federal right has been violated.  But it is not
up to the court to issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent
judgment that the state court acted contrary to federal law.  Instead, Congress has instructed
federal courts, in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), that the writ may issue if the prisoner demonstrates
that the adjudication of his claim by the state courts
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence in the State court
proceedings.
The Court has not passed on constitutional claims based on this standard, but it has in
several cases applied the standard, sometimes unanimously, without any suggestion that a
constitutional question may be presented. See, e.g., Price v. Vincent, 123 S. Ct. 1848 (2003),
and cases cited therein.
123 Generally, these rights include freedom from cruel and unusual punishment or the right
to due process. 
Congress’ power to confer, withhold, and restrict both jurisdiction and equity
authority was also powerfully revealed in the cases arising from the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942.119  Fearful that the price control program might be nullified by
injunctions, Congress provided for a special court in which persons could challenge
the validity of price regulations issued by the Government from which appeals from
the court to the Supreme Court could be taken. The constitutionality of the Act was
sustained in Lockerty v. Phillips,120 although those skeptical of the breadth of the law
note that the Court itself referred to the fact that it arose in “the exigencies of war.”121
One modern example of congressional control over the processes of the federal
courts122 is the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) of 1996.  For the last 20 - 30
years, many prisons and jails in this country have been enjoined to make certain
changes based on findings that the conditions of these institutions violated the
constitutional rights123 of inmates. Many of these injunctions came as a result of
consent decrees entered into between inmates and prison officials and endorsed by
federal courts, so that relief was not necessarily tied to violations found. Many state
officials and Members of Congress have complained of the breadth of relief granted
by federal judges, as these injunctions often required expensive remedial actions.
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To ensure that an injunction granting prospective relief does not remain in effect during the
months or years that a trial of a prison conditions case typically takes, the Act requires
courts to rule "promptly" on motions to terminate prospective relief, with mandamus
available to remedy failure to do so.
125 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2). Thus, the statute expressly provided for the suspension of
existing prospective relief within 30 days (or 90 days) from the filing of a motion to
terminate the prospective relief. That suspension continues only until the court conducts a
trial and makes the findings the Act requires of it, but this period will doubtless be for an
extended time given the complexities of the trial that must be conducted.
126 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
127 None of the other provisions described herein was put in issue.
128 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995); United States v. Klein, 13 Wall.
(80 U.S.) 128 (1872).
129 Miller, 530 U.S. at 341-50.
130 On the other hand, if the time limits interfered with the inmates’ meaningful opportunity
to be heard, that would be a due process problem. Id. at 350. Since the decision below had
been based on separation of powers, the due process argument was not before the Court.
Thus, the constitutionality of the PLRA overall, and of the “automatic stay” in particular,
is as yet undetermined, although the Court’s opinion seems disposed to a measure of
acceptance.
The PLRA was designed to curb the discretion of the federal courts in these
types of actions.  Thus, the central requirement of the Act was a provision that a court
“shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such
relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of
the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation
of the Federal right.”124 The most pointed provision of the PLRA in this context is the
so-called “automatic stay” section, which states that a motion to terminate
prospective relief “shall operate as a stay” of that relief during  the period beginning
30 days after the filing of the motion (extendable to up to 90 days for “good cause”)
and ending when the court rules on the motion.125 
In Miller v. French,126 inmates attacked the constitutionality of the “automatic
stay” provision,127 as a violation of separation of powers.128 By a 5-to-4 vote, the
Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that the PLRA did not set aside a final
judgment of a federal court, but rather it operated to change the underlying law and
thus required the altering of the prospective relief issued under the old law.129
Secondly, the Court noted that separation of powers did not prevent Congress from
changing applicable law and then imposing the consequences of the court’s
application of the new legal standard. Finally, the Court held that the stay provision
did not interfere with core judicial functions as it could not be determined whether
the time limitations interfered with judicial functions through its relative brevity.130
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134 In some of these cases, Congress had not acted in these cases so much in defiance of the
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also Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Board of Trustees of Univ. of
Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); but see Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v.
Hibbs, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003).
V.  Congressional Power to Revise Specific Judicial
Decisions
 
A. Constitutional versus Statutory Decisions
 As the federal courts are the prescribed authorities to interpret the Constitution
and to establish precedents,131 Congress is relatively limited in its ability to change
constitutional holdings. The primary route by which Congress can implement such
changes is also a difficult one: proposing an amendment to the Constitution and
working to secure ratification. The Eleventh Amendment, the first sentence of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Sixteenth Amendment, the Twenty-
fourth Amendment, and the Twenty-sixth Amendment were all directed to
overturning the results of court decisions. The alternative method of amendment set
out in Article V, the congressional calling of a constitutional convention upon
petition by two-thirds of the states, has never been successfully used, although an
effort to call a convention to propose an amendment to override the “one person, one
vote” decision of Reynolds v. Sims132 fell just one state short.133
Congress has, of course, passed legislation which was intended to change the
results or effects of judicial decisions. Although the Supreme Court considers itself
bound by stare decisis, it is in effect loosely bound, and thus is in a position to
consider the positions of its coordinate branches on constitutional issues.
Nonetheless, this qualification has not appeared to have concerned the Court in most
cases, as the Court has generally invalidated statutes that Congress has enacted to set
aside constitutional decisions by the Supreme Court.134  
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137 Id. at 226-27. This has long been established law. See, e.g., United States v. Schooner
Peggy, l Cr. (5 U.S.)103 (1801).
138 18 How. (59 U.S.) 421 (1856).
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B.  Pending Decisions versus Final Decisions
Congress has significantly more authority to affect decisions by the federal
courts interpreting either statutes or common law than it does regarding constitutional
decisions. However, even here Congress is limited to affecting pending or future
court decision, not final ones. Thus, in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,135 the Court
had rendered a final decision determining the limitation period applicable to the filing
of securities litigation, finding a much shorter period than had been thought to apply,
so that many pending suits had to be dismissed for lack of timely filing. Congress
passed a new law, establishing the longer limitations period that had been thought to
be applicable, and it authorized refiling of the dismissed suits and adjudication of
them.  The Court in Plaut held that the federal courts had the authority to render a
judgment conclusively resolving a case, and Congress violates the separation of
powers when it purports to alter final judgments of Article III courts.136
The Court was careful to delineate the difference between attempting to alter a
final judgment (one rendered by a court and either not appealed or affirmed on
appeal), and legislatively amending a statute so as to change the law as it existed at
the time a court issued a decision that was on appeal or otherwise still alive at the
time a federal court reviewed the determination below.  A court must apply the law
as revised when it considers the prior interpretation, even in a pending case.137 Thus,
in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,138 the Court had held that a
bridge was an obstruction of navigable waters and ordered an injunction issued to
abate it. Congress passed a statute pronouncing the bridge not an obstruction of
navigable waters, and the Court required the withdrawal of the injunction, inasmuch
as it was within Congress’ power to regulate commerce and navigable waters. 
Similarly, in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society,139 a federal district court had
held that the environmental impact statement prepared to support the issuance of
logging permits that endangered the spotted owl was inadequate and must be done
over.  Congress passed a rider to an appropriation act excusing the necessity for the
statement, and the Court upheld the new law and its effect on future actions as a
permissible change in law. Clearly, however, the difference between Plaut and
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141 Pub. L. 104-205, “Treatment of Certain Pending Child Custody Cases in Superior Court
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custody cases in the District of Columbia Superior Court, but was written so narrowly as to
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Case: Legal Issues, Kenneth R. Thomas. 
143 844 F.2d 800, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
144 Id. at 804.
Robertson is a matter of degree and Congress walks close to the line when it
legislates against the background of a decided case.140
C. General Cases versus Specific Cases
1. Due Process and Equal Protection.
On occasion, Congress has attempted to legislate regarding a specific court case
or cases,141 such as a recent attempt by Congress to intervene in the case of Theresa
Marie Schiavo despite court findings that she had previously expressed her desires
to not receive medical treatment under certain circumstance.142 An argument could
be made that congressional legislation that applies to a specific court case may be
construed as imposing additional burdens on the litigants involved.  Legislation that
identifies specified individuals to bear additional legal burdens raises issues of due
process and equal protection. For instance, in News America Publishing, Inc. v.
FCC,143 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia applied
heightened scrutiny to an act of Congress that singled out “with the precision of a
laser beam,” a corporation controlled by Rupert Murdoch. Murdoch’s corporation
had applied for, and received, temporary waivers from the FCC’s cross-ownership
rules, so that the corporation could acquire two TV licenses, one in Boston, and the
other in New York.144 Subsequently, Congress passed a law that prevented the FCC
from extending any  existing temporary waivers; at the time, Murdoch’s corporation
was the only current beneficiary of any such temporary waivers.  The corporation
sued, arguing a violation of Equal Protection in the context of the First Amendment.
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147 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447 (1965).
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149 Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 472-484 (1977).
150 Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Group, 468 U.S. 841, 847 (1984).
151 The Supreme Court has identified various types of punishments which have historically
been associated with Bills of Attainder. These traditionally have included capital
punishment, imprisonment, fines, banishment, confiscation of property, and more recently,
the barring of individuals or groups from participation in specified employment or
vocations. 433 U.S. at 474-75.  There are no indications by the Court that harming a
person’s reputation or intervening in guardianship rights is a type of “punishment”
traditionally engaged in by legislatures as a means of punishing individuals for wrongdoing.
152 The Supreme Court has indicated that some legislative burdens not traditionally
associated with Bills of Attainder might nevertheless “functionally” serve as punishment.
433 U.S. at 475.  The Court has stated, however, that the type and severity of a legislatively
imposed burden should be examined to see whether it could reasonably be said to further
a non-punitive legislation purpose. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69
(1963); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 476. 
Based on this argument, the court evaluated the law under a heightened scrutiny
standard, and struck it down.145 
2. Bill of Attainder.
If Congress does legislate regarding a particular court case, this may also raise
the issue of the prohibition on Bills of Attainder.146 Under this provision, Congress
is prohibited from passing legislation which “appl[ies] either to a named individual
or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment
on them without a judicial trial.”147 Generally, the prohibition on Bills of Attainder
is intended to prevent Congress from assuming judicial functions and conducting
trials.148  
The two main criteria which the courts will look to in order to determine
whether legislation is a Bill of Attainder are 1) whether specific individuals are
affected by the statute, and 2) whether the legislation inflicts a punishment on those
individuals.149 The Supreme Court has held that legislation meets the criteria of
specificity if it applies to a person or group of people who are described by past
conduct,150 which would seem to include participation in a court case. The mere fact
that focused legislation imposes burdensome consequences, however, does not
require that a court find such legislation to be an unconstitutional of Bill of Attainder.
Rather, the Court has identified three types of “punitive” legislation which are barred
by the ban on Bills of Attainder: 1) where the burden is such as has traditionally been
found to be punitive;151 2) where the type and severity of burdens imposed cannot
reasonably be said to further non-punitive legislative purposes;152 and 3) where the
legislative record evinces a congressional intent to punish. 
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154 The act provided:
(a) In any pending case involving custody over a minor child or the visitation rights of a
parent of a minor child in the Superior Court which is described in subsection (b)
(1) at anytime after the child attains 13 years of age, the party to the case who is
described in subsection (b)(1) may not have custody over, or visitation rights with, the child
without the child’s consent; and
(2) if any person had actual or legal custody over the child or offered safe refuge to the
child while the case (or other actions relating to the case) was pending, the court may not
deprive the person of custody or visitation rights over the child or otherwise impose
sanctions on the person on the grounds that the person had such custody or offered such
refuge.
 (b) A case described in this subsection is a case in which -
(1) the child asserts that a party to the case has been sexually abusive with the child;
(2) the child has resided outside of the United States for not less than 24 consecutive
months;
(3) any of the parties to the case has denied custody or visitation to another party in
violation of an order of the court for not less than 24 consecutive months; and
(4) any of the parties to the case has lived outside of the District of Columbia during
such period of denial of custody or visitation.
An opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
specifically addressed the issue of whether a congressional bill addressing a pending
court case was a Bill of Attainder. In Foretich v. United States,153 the court
considered a legislative rider to the 1997 Department of Transportation
Appropriations Act that provided for specific procedures to be followed in resolving
child custody cases in the District of Columbia Superior Court, but was written so
narrowly as to apply to just one case.154 This case involved a protracted custody
battle, where allegations of sexual abuse by the husband had been made. Because the
child in the case was no longer a minor, the issue of removal of custodianship was
declared by the court to be moot.  However, the court found that act imposed
“punishment” under the functional test because it harmed the father’s reputation, and
because it could not be said to further non-punitive purpose. 
VI. Conclusion
Congress has a wide range of tools available to it to exercise its legislative
authorities with respect to the Judicial Branch, and these powers may be used to alter
almost all aspects of how the federal courts are organized and administered.
However, as with other constitutional authorities, these powers are subject to some
constitutional limitations.  Although the exact parameters of these limitations have
not been established, it is likely the Supreme Court would impose limitations on
congressional legislation that did not comply with dictates of due process, equal
protection, and separation of powers.
